Due to Csiszár and Körner, the capacity of classical wiretap channels has a single-letter characterization in terms of the private information. For quantum wiretap channels, however, it is known that regularization of the private information is necessary to reach the capacity. Here, we study hybrid classical-quantum wiretap channels in order to resolve to what extent quantum effects are needed to witness non-additivity phenomena in quantum Shannon theory. For wiretap channels with quantum inputs but classical outputs, we prove that the characterization of the capacity in terms of the private information stays single-letter. Hence, entangled input states are of no asymptotic advantage in this setting. For wiretap channels with classical inputs, we show by means of explicit examples that the private information already becomes non-additive when either one of the two receivers becomes quantum (with the other receiver staying classical). This gives non-additivity examples that are not caused by entanglement and illustrates that quantum adversaries are strictly different from classical adversaries in the wiretap model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to its classical counterpart, non-additivity phenomena of entropic expressions already make an appearance in some basic settings of quantum Shannon theory. This includes the quantum capacity [8, 16] , the private capacity [12, 17] , and the classical capacity of quantum channels [10] . One of the most vexing such problems was posed by the additivity conjecture for the Holevo information [15] . Hastings disproved the conjecture with an example in which using entangled inputs to a quantum channel boosts the rate at which information can be transmitted [10] .
Here, we investigate private communication over wiretap channels to understand the essential quantum properties needed for entropic channel capacity formulas to become non-additive. Originally introduced by Wyner [20] , a wiretap channel W BC|A has one input system A for Alice and two outputs B and C to Bob and Charlie, respectively. The goal is then to transmit classical information from Alice to Bob without leaking any information to Charlie. In particular, we are interested in whether the private capacity P(W) -the maximum rate of private transmission -has a single-letter expression in terms of the private information
Here, p V is a probability distribution over an auxiliary random variable V and ρ v A is a quantum state conditional on the value of V and with support on A. For quantum wiretap channels, the private capacity is known to be characterized by the regularization of the private information [2, 6] , i.e. P(W) = lim
This is precisely how the analysis proceeds in the case of classical wiretap channels as well, but Csiszár and Körner [4] further showed that the private information is additive. That is, we have P 1 (W 1 ⊗W 2 ) = P 1 (W 1 )+P 1 (W 2 ) making the regularization unnecessary. Our main result in this paper is that if two of the parties in the wiretap channel are chosen to be classical, then P(W) = P 1 (W) when the input is quantum, while there exist channels for which P(W) > P 1 (W) if either output is quantum. Hence, in this scenario neither do entangled inputs allow for non-additivity effects to occur, nor are they necessary for them! The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we fix our notation, and in Section III we examine general properties of wiretap channels and the private information. In particular, we show that one can always take |V | ≤ |A| 2 in the private information optimization Eq. (1). Then we show additivity for quantum inputs in Section IV and give the non-additive examples in Section V and Section VI.
II. SETTING

A. Systems
Quantum systems are denoted by A, B, C and have finite dimensions |A|, |B|, |C|, respectively. Quantum states are linear, positive semi-definite operators of trace one and denoted by ρ A ∈ D(A). Quantum states ρ A ∈ D(A) are called pure if they are of rank one, in which case we also write ρ A = |ψ ψ| A . Quantum channels W B|A from A to B correspond to completely positive and trace-preserving maps from the linear operators on A to the linear operators on B. Classical systems are denoted by V, W, X, Y, Z and have finite dimensions |V |, |W |, |X|, |Y |, |Z|, respectively. Classical states are density matrices diagonal in the computational basis {|x x|} x∈X and denoted by ρ X ∈ D(X). Classical channels from X to Y correspond to conditional probability distributions p Y |X (y|x), but may also at times be denoted by N Y |X , with the support indicating the classical domain and target. The notation X m = (X 1 , ..., X m ) denotes an m-tuple of registers and will be used in the context of channel coding to denote a code-block of length m that encodes a logical system X.
B. Entropies
For ρ ABC ∈ D(ABC) and its reduced states, the entropy is defined as H(A) ρ := −Tr [ρ A log ρ A ], the conditional entropy of A given B as H(A|B) ρ := H(AB) ρ − H(B) ρ , the mutual information between A and B as I(A : B) ρ := H(A) ρ + H(B) ρ − H(AB) ρ , and the conditional mutual information between A and B given C as I(A :
Here and henceforth any quantum definition applies to classical probability distributions as well -by embedding them as matrices diagonal in the computational basis {|x x|} x∈X .
C. Wiretap Channels
A wiretap channel is given by a quantum channel W BC|A with one sender Alice A and two receivers Bob B and Charlie C, where Bob acts as the legitimate receiver and Charlie as the adversarial party. Note that we do not require W BC|A to be an isometric channel (as often done in the literature), i.e. the channel to Charlie is not necessarily the complement of the channel to Bob. We are then interested in hybrid classical-quantum settings, where some of the systems are classical. This lead us to use the following definition.
Definition II.1. A reduction W B|A (W C|A ) of a wiretap channel W BC|A to the legitimate receiver (adversarial party) is obtained by tracing out the adversarial party (legitimate receiver), i.e W B|A (·) := Tr C W BC|A (·) or W C|A := Tr B W BC|A (·) .
We will often also write W BC|A := W B|A /W C|A for a full wiretap channel, when constructing it from explicit example reductions W B|A and W C|A .
In later sections we will consider reductions that are either fully classical channels or classical-quantum channels. From these, we will then construct the following types of wiretap channels.
Definition II.2. A quantum-classical-classical (qcc) wiretap channel with quantum sender Alice A, but classical receivers Bob Y and Charlie Z is given by
This setting is notable because it allows for entangled inputs to the wiretap channel, but only separable states at the outputs. It thus begs the question of whether using entangled input states allows for boosting the rate at which information can be transmitted despite the fact that each reduction is an entanglement-breaking channel.
Definition II.3. A classical-quantum-classical (cqc) wiretap channel with classical sender Alice X and classical adversarial receiver Charlie Z, but quantum legitimate receiver Bob B is given by
for conditional probability distributions p(z|x) and quantum states ρ z B .
Here, only separable states are allowed as inputs to the channel, so one might think that the private information is additive in this case.
Definition II.4. A classical-classical-quantum (ccq) wiretap channel with classical sender Alice X and classical legitimate receiver Bob Y , but quantum adversarial receiver Charlie C is given by
for conditional probability distributions p(y|x) and quantum states ρ y C .
Again, one might expect the private information to be additive given that only separable states are allowed for inputs. Some simple channels that we will employ to construct wiretap channel examples are as follows.
Definition II.5. The binary symmetric channel BSC(p) with crossover probability p is a classical-classical channel
where addition is carried out modulo 2.
This channel may also be thought of as a quantum channel N B|A (·) := (1 − p)½(·)½ + pX(·)X for the Pauli X-matrix on system B.
Definition II.6. The binary erasure channel BEC(p) with erasure probability p is a classical-classical channel
Here, again a fully quantum binary erasure channel N B|A may be defined by N B|A (·) = (1 − p)(·) + p|e e| B .
Definition II.7. The binary pure state channel BPC(f ) with fidelity f is a classical-quantum channel N A|X with pure state outputs |ψ ψ| and |φ φ|, such that f := | φ|ψ | and |0 0| X −→ |ψ ψ| A and |1 1| X −→ |φ φ| A .
III. PROPERTIES OF THE PRIVATE INFORMATION
To evaluate the private information in general we follow ideas from the classical work [14] and start by rewriting
where
. This expression is in general hard to evaluate, as the underlying optimization problem is non-convex. However, we immediately have the upper bound
Moreover, whenever f W ≥ 0 for all input states ρ A , then min ρ f W = 0 and hence
We call such wiretap channels W more-capable [11] , where for the classical case this can be seen as the sufficiency to choose V = X in Eq. (1) . Whenever the function f W is concave, we call the wiretap channel W less-noisy. Such channels are then in particular also more-capable and thus the optimization problem in Eq. (12) becomes convex and therefore easily tractable. Contrary to the classical case, however, we do not know if less-noisy wiretap channels have additive private information in general. 1 We also have the notions of anti-less-noisy and anti-more-capable wiretap channels, where the roles of the legitimate receiver Bob and adversarial receiver Charlie are interchanged. Note that for anti-less-noisy channels P 0 (W) = 0, as well as that for anti-more-capable channels P 1 (W) = 0. Finally, a well-known sufficient criteria for additivity of the private information is degradability [3, 7] . That is, when there exists a channel E C|B such that W C|A = E C|B • W B|A . The private information is also additive for anti-degradable channels, when there exists a channel F B|C such that W B|A = F B|C • W C|A . However, then we immediately have P(W) = P 1 (W) = 0. Next, we prove a cardinality upper bound for the private information.
Lemma III.2 (Cardinality bound). Let registers V, A be defined as in Eq. (1). Then, we have |V | ≤ |A| 2 .
Proof. Note that we can alternatively write Eq. (10) as
Then, following [5, Theorem 17.11] we consider the function h which maps any state ρ to its Bloch vector, as well as the value g W (ρ). Recall that the Bloch vector has d 2 − 1 components and completely specifies the state ρ. Since h is continuous, the image S of the set of states under h is a compact, convex, and connected set in R d 2 . Now, suppose p V and ρ v A are optimal, leading to an average state ρ A :
By Fenchel-Eggleston's strengthening of Carathéodory's theorem, as given in Lemma III.1, h(ρ A ) can be represented as d 2 i=1 p i s i for suitable probabilities p i and points s i ∈ S. For each i, the first d 2 − 1 components of s i specify a state ρ i , while the last component is h W (ρ i ). Therefore, there exists a random variable V ′ of cardinality d 2 with p V ′ (i) = p i and a preparation map P ′ A|V with P ′ A|V =i = ρ i which is also optimal. If we restrict the possible inputs to W to form a commuting set, i.e. diagonal in some basis, then only d − 1 components are needed for the Bloch vector, and we recover the classical cardinality bound |V | ≤ |X|.
IV. QUANTUM SENDER ALICE
Here, we prove that the private information is additive for wiretap channels W Y Z|A with quantum input system A but classical output systems Y Z. Theorem 1. Let W 1 := W Y1Z1|A1 and W 2 := W Y2Z2|A2 be two qcc-wiretap channels with quantum senders A 1 , A 2 , classical legitimate receivers Y 1 , Y 2 and classical adversaries Z 1 , Z 2 . Then, we have
Proof. The proof makes use of a variant of the classical key identity in [5, Lemma 17.12] . Suppose ρ V A1A2 is the optimizer in P 1 (W 1 ⊗ W 2 ) and call the outputs Y 1 Y 2 for Bob and Z 1 Z 2 for Charlie. Let W 1 := W Y1Z1|A1 and W 2 := W Y2Z2|A2 , then for the probability distribution
The first equation follows using the chain rule for the conditional mutual information, while the second follows since conditioning is equivalent to averaging. Now, consider the first maximization, for which we require the joint distribution p V Y1Z1Z2 . Suppose the optimal input state has the form
The channels are just measurements, so letting Λ y1,z1 and Γ y2,z2 be the associated POVM elements for W 1 and W 2 respectively yields
Now, define the normalized states σ v,z2 via
for p Z2|V the conditional distribution computed from the distribution p V Y1Z1Z2 . Writing in the decomposition
Thus, we have confirmed that when conditioning on the value of Z 2 , the outputs Y 1 and Z 1 are related to V via W composed with a preparation channel P A|V Z2 . Therefore, we have that
A similar argument holds for the second term, implying
Notably, this shows that entangled input states are of no use and gives a novel single-letter characterization in quantum Shannon theory. Applying Theorem 1 inductively to Eq. (2) gives the following characterisation.
Corollary IV.1. For quantum-classical-classical wiretap channels W Y Z|A we have that P(W Y Z|A ) = P 1 (W Y Z|A ).
V. QUANTUM LEGITIMATE RECEIVER BOB
Here, we show that the private information is non-additive for wiretap channels W BZ|X with classical input system X and classical adversary Z, but quantum legitimate receiver B. The proof follows from a counterexample to additivity of the private information for an explicit example channel W BZ|X . We show that there exists a parameter regime for this channel, for which the single-letter private information vanishes, but for which the regularized private information stays positive using a CSS stabilizer code. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, classical adversaries already make classical-quantum channel coding amenable to non-additivity effects in the wiretap model. Note that this is not the case for classical communication over classical-quantum channels, whose capacity has the same single letter maximization of mutual information as the capacity for the purely classical channel. 
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the private information P 1 W BZ|X [r] vanishes for channel parameter values r ≥ 0.5424. Second, we give positive lower bounds on the private capacity P W BZ|X [r] for the channel parameter regime r ∈ (0.5424, 0.545) by constructing an explicit block pre-processing for n = 2, thus demonstrating non-additivity. a. Private information Our goal is to show that for r ≥ 0.5424 we have P 1 W BZ|X [r] = 0. We have a binaryinput problem for P 1 W BZ|X [r] and the cardinality bound |V | ≤ 2 from Lemma III.2, so we can write the same optimization as in Eq. (10) . Via Jensen's inequality it follows that P 1 (W BZ|X [r]) = 0 when f W[r] (ρ X ) is a convex function, i.e. when its second derivative is positive. In Appendix A we thus explicitly calculate the second derivative of the function
with ω X ′ BZ = x p X (x)|x x| X ′ ⊗ W BZ|X [r](|x x| X ) and find that it becomes positive for r larger or equal to the solution of
This leads to the thresholdr ≈ 0.5424, at which point the channel becomes anti-less-noisy and hence P 1 (W[r]) = 0 as claimed. Noisy pre-processing is necessary for rates close to the threshold of the private information, as we also show that the channel is anti-more-capable for r larger than roughly 0.534. On the other hand, neither pre-processing nor regularization are necessary to evaluate the capacity for r less or equal thañ
for in this parameter region the channel is degradable. b. Private capacity To obtain lower bounds on the private capacity P(W BZ|X [r]), we construct an explicit block pre-processing for n = 2. Its private information is positive for the channel parameter regime r ∈ (0.5424, 0.545) for which P 1 (W BZ|X [r]) = 0, thus demonstrating non-additivity. The pre-processing scheme is given by n = 2 parity encoding, call it P, which maps
(27b) Fig. 1 shows the regularized private information 1 2 P 1 (W BZ|X [r] ⊗2 • P X 2 |X ) of this scheme. We find a new channel parameter threshold value ofr ≈ 0.545 offering a slight improvement overr.
VI. QUANTUM ADVERSARIAL RECEIVER CHARLIE
Here, we show that the private information is non-additive for wiretap channels W Y C|X with classical input system X and classical legitimate receiver Y , but quantum adversary C. The proof follows from a counterexample to additivity of the private information for an explicit example channel W Y C|X . We show that there exists a parameter regime for this channel, for which the single-letter private information vanishes, but for which the regularized private information stays positive using stabilizer codes. Hence, in the wiretap model, quantum adversaries are strictly different from classical adversaries in the sense that non-additivity effects become possible, whereas classically this is not the case. (28)
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the private information P 1 W Y C|X [p] for the example channel W Y C|X [p] := BSC(p)/BPC(1 − 2p) vanishes for channel parameter values p ≥ 0.1241. Second, we give positive lower bounds on the private capacity P W Y C|X [p] for the channel parameter regime p ∈ (0.1241, 0.129) by constructing an explicit block pre-processing based on the repetition code and noisy pre-processing, borrowing a construction in [17] and thus demonstrating non-additivity. In fact, this example is implicit in [17] , as W Y C|X is the result of restricting the quantum channel considered there (the Pauli channel with independent bit and phase errors at identical rates) to standard basis input states. a. Private information In the first part of the proof, we show that for p ≥ 0.1241 we have P 1 (W Y C|X [p]) = 0. We again have a binary-input problem for P 1 (W Y C|X [p]) and the cardinality bounds from Lemma III.2. Via Jensen's inequality it follows that P 1 (W Y C|X [p]) = 0 when f W[p] (ρ X ) is a convex function, i.e. when its second derivative is positive. In Appendix B we thus explicitly calculate the second derivative of the function
(|x x| X ) and show that it becomes positive for p larger or equal to the solution of , we employ the block preprocessing from [17] , adapted to the channel setting. In particular, consider the pre-processing P X n |X [q] resulting from n-bit repetition encoding followed by i.i.d. bit-flip noise addition at rate q by the sender. Denoting the input to the pre-processing by X and bounding P 0 (W Y C|X [p] ⊗n • P X n |X [q]) from Eq. (12) by choosing a uniform X, we find via explicit calculation in Appendix C:
Here, S n 2 ∈ {0, 1} n−1 denotes the syndrome of the repetition code as obtained by the legitimate receiver, W is the value of the logical bit error, and ρ p,q is the output state of BPC(1 − 2p) for a zero-valued bit in the code-block that has undergone the pre-processing bit-flip channel. This is precisely Eq. (2) in [17] . As numerically evaluated therein, the expression remains positive at least up to the thresholdp ≈ 0.129, which is obtained from n = 400 and q = 0.32. This concludes the proof of Eq. (28).
Note that it remains an open question if the private capacity is non-zero all the way up to the degradability threshold ofp ≈ 0.146. In Fig. 2 we provide a comparison plot between P 1 (W Y C|X [p]) and max q
for the n = 3 pre-processing scheme. We find a threshold of 0.1245, and perhaps coincidentally the optimal q also appears to be 0.32 in this case. 
VII. DISCUSSION
We determined for which cases the private information of hybrid classical-quantum wiretap channels is non-additive. We found additivity violations when either of the two receivers becomes quantum; interestingly without any entanglement being present. On the other hand, we also showed that for quantum inputs but classical receivers the private information remains additive. That is, entangled input states are of no help. We note that the setting in [17] is already an instance of non-additivity without entangled inputs, because the combination of repetition coding and standard basis inputs produces separable states. This is precisely what we use in Section VI. Moreover, we can regard the parity encoding in Section V as a phase error-detecting code with stabilizer XX, since this operator also stabilizes the outputs of Eq.(27). However, the link between private and quantum coding does not hold for more general preprocessing. For instance, [9] studies the effects of preprocessing using the five qubit code on various Pauli channels. But this cannot be interpreted as a classical preprocessing for a classical wiretap channel, since in the five qubit code the relative phases of the codewords play a decisive role, yet they disappear in any classical encoding.
Similar to general additivity questions in quantum Shannon theory, it remains open to quantify the magnitude of how non-additive the private information can become. The results here may shed some light on the role of degenerate codes in non-additivity. Interestingly, pre-processing based on repetition coding does not lead to non-additivity for the quantum Bob example, nor does parity encoding lead to non-additivity for the quantum Charlie example. Is this a general trend or just a coincidence? Another interesting question to resolve is if more capable and less noisy wiretap channels have an additive private information -as they do in the classical case. More broadly, we might ask how far we can push the question about the quantumness needed to witness non-additivity phenomena in Shannon information theory. A natural candidate that remains open is to resolve if Marton's inner bound for general broadcast channels [13] is additive or not [1] . Insights from quantum information theory as presented here might be able to shine some light on this long-standing question. 
Since ω X ′ BZ is a classical-quantum state, one can show that
and thus
To evaluate this expression, we will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 (Second derivative of Shannon entropy).
To the classical illegitimate receiver Z, we have the BEC((1 − p) 2 ) channel yielding the output state
where p X := p X (x = 0), i.e. we choose p X to be the parametrization for the binary input distribution. Since the output to the illegitimate receiver Z is classical (i.e. diagonal in the computational basis), the eigenvalues can simply be read off as
Using lemma A.1 we thus have
To the quantum legitimate receiver B, we have the BPC(p) channel, yielding the output state
where |ψ 0 = |0 and |ψ 1 = r |0 + √ 1 − r 2 |1 , such that
Via the characteristic polynomial, the eigenvalues are found to be
It thus follows that
Using Lemma A.1, we obtain for the second derivative
.
We may then rewrite the second derivative in terms ofg(r, p X ) as
This expression is symmetric in p X around p X = 1 2 . In order to find the threshold parameterr, we set q = 1/2, while setting Eq. (A12) to zero and rearranging for r, which yields Eq. (25). One can then numerically verify that the expression is positive away from q = 1 2 , thus proving convexity of f W[r] (ρ X ) for r ≥r. 
and W Y C|X [p] := BSC(p)/BPC(1 − 2p). Since ω X ′ Y C is a classical-quantum state, one can show that
where 
where we have that p X := p X (x = 0). Since the output to classical legitimate receiver Y is classical, i.e. diagonal in the computational basis, the eigenvalues can simply be read off as
Thus, we have
(B7)
To the quantum illegitimate receiver C, we have the BPC (1 − 2p) , yielding the output state
where |φ
and ∂ 2 ∂p X 2 λ ± = ± 1 2 16 p(1 − p)g(p, p X ) 2 − (8p(1 − p)(2p X − 1)) 2 g(p, p X ) 3 . 
We may then rewrite the second derivative in terms of c := g 2 (p, p X ) = 1 − 16p(1 − p)p X (1 − p X ) as
Again, this expression is symmetric in p X around p X = 1 2 . In order to find the threshold parameterp, we set p X = 1 2 , for which the middle term vanishes, leaving just
Setting this to zero gives Eq. (30). One can then numerically verify that the second derivative is positive away from p X = 1 2 , thus proving convexity of f W[p] (ρ X ) for p ≥p.
where ω x C n is defined as
such that ω X ′ C n = 1 2 x∈{0,1} |x x| X ⊗ ω x C n . Notice that ω x⊕1 C n = Z ⊗n ω x C n Z ⊗n and we can thus rewrite ω C n as ω C n = 1 2 ω 0 C n + Z ⊗n ω 0 C n Z ⊗n . Evaluating I(X ′ : C n ) ω we then have
since H ω x⊕1 C n = H (ω x C n ) due to isometric invariance of the von Neumann entropy. Our definition of ω 0 C n coincides with the definition of ρ ⊗m p,q from [18] , so that we can write I(X ′ : C n ) ω 
since the von Neumann entropy is additive for product states. We now proceed to evaluate I(X ′ : Y n ) ω . To do this, we look at the combination of the BSC(p) with the preprocessing map P X n |X [q]. We can thus write the state ω X ′ Y n as
We can thus evaluate I(X ′ : Y n ) ω as I(X ′ : Y n ) ω = I(X ′ : V 1 S n 2 ) σ [via isometric invariance of the von Neumann entropy] (C19) = H(V 1 S n 2 ) σ − H(V 1 S n 2 |X ′ ) σ [via definition] (C20) = H(V 1 ) σ + H(S n 2 ) σ − H(V 1 S n 2 |X ′ ) σ [via σ V1S n 2 = σ V1 ⊗ σ S n 2 + chain rule] (C21) = 1 + H(S n 2 ) σ − H(V 1 S n 2 |X) σ [ since σ V1 is maximally mixed] (C22)
